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The Turbulent Aftermath of
Crawford v. Washington: Where Do Child
Abuse Victims' Statements Stand?
by STEPHANIE MCMAHON*
I. Introduction
The Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington clarified the
meaning of the Confrontation Clause and set forth a new bright line
rule regarding the requirement of cross-examination for testimonial
statements Because of this new rule, many, if not all, child abuse
victims' statements are potentially inadmissible in court. This note
addresses the changes of the evidentiary analysis in the wake of
Crawford, some potential interpretations of the decision, and
alternative methods to admit these crucial witness and victim
statements into court.
II. Purposes and Interpretations of the Confrontation Clause
The Sixth Amendment, although deceptively simple, provides
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him."2  This
clause has traditionally conferred two important rights upon the
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1. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); see Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010
(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that Crawford is a new "watershed rule," and is thus, retroactive),
but see Murillo v. Frank, 402 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that Crawford did not apply
retroactively on collateral attack).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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defendant-the right to be present in the courtroom during trial and
the right to require prosecution witnesses to testify directly in
3defendant's presence.
The confrontation requirement of the Sixth Amendment has
multiple goals, including: (1) discouraging deliberate perjury by
prosecution witnesses by requiring testimony in public; (2) allowing
an innocent defendant, in good faith, to correct any misconceptions or
mistestimony upon hearing the witness' story in public; and (3)
through cross-examination, defendant can discover gaps and
weaknesses in witness' testimony, thereby allowing an opportunity for
the witness to correct or clarify the testimony. The Clause, which has
the weight of history behind it, eliminates the need for intermediaries
to testify and advances a symbolic purpose, as human nature regards
face-to-face confrontation between the accused and accuser to be
essential to a fair criminal prosecution
A. Roberts test of reliability
Prior to the surprising Crawford decision in 2004, the standard
for addressing the admissibility of hearsay evidence was a two-prong
test set forth in Ohio v. Roberts.6 The first prong required the
prosecution to demonstrate the unavailability of the witness intended
to testify against the defendant.7 For the second prong, the court
would apply a test of reliability to determine if the evidence fell
within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" or demonstrated
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."8  Although firmly
rooted hearsay exceptions appeared relatively straightforward9, the
scope of the Roberts doctrine, including the vague outlines of what
constituted "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness," was
3. Carole A. Chase, The Five Faces of the Confrontation Clause, 40 HOUS. L. REV.
1003, 1006 (2003); see Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878).
4. Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 688-89
(1996) [hereinafter Sixth Amendment].
5. Richard D. Friedman, The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted and Transformed,
2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 439, 441-43 (2004) [hereinafter Confrontation Clause Re-
Rooted] (stating that for many centuries, accused persons have had the right to confront
the accuser and thus, it is important to continue to support such a right).
6. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
7. Id. at 65.
8. Id. at 66.
9. See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (explaining that firmly rooted
hearsay exceptions include spontaneous declarations, statements made in the course of
receiving medical treatment because of "at least two centuries" of acceptance for
exceptions).
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incredibly broad and proved to be unmanageable.'0
The Roberts test diverted from the focus and purpose of the
Confrontation Clause, and was plainly ineffective. First, the Roberts
test categorized statements by hearsay exceptions, whereas the
Confrontation Clause does not address hearsay directly." Hearsay
statements, the out of court statements offered for the truth of the
matter asserted, do not always effect the right of the defendant to be
confronted by his/her accusers, causing the Roberts test to be
overbroad. 2 Second, reliability is not the appropriate standard for
Confrontation Clause analysis because the trier of fact is responsible
for judging witness reliability. The fact that a statement falls within a
"firmly rooted hearsay exception" does not necessarily make it more
reliable. 3 Even if a statement did not fit within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception, the statement could be admissible, under Roberts,
if it satisfied the "particularized guarantees of truthworthiness" test.
4
This reliability test was unpredictable because it depended heavily
upon factors each specific judge considered and the weight he/she
apportioned to each. 5 There was little guidance to investigators and
prosecutors as to what statements would be admissible, and even less
consistency in light of the text of the Confrontation Clause-which
only addresses the right of the accused to be confronted, and does not
cover reliability or the judicially-constructed hearsay exceptions.
B. New Crawford test for "testimonial statements"
To eliminate the standardless discretion given to courts to
determine and weigh the "indicia of reliability" individually in each
case 6 , the Court made clear in Crawford v. Washington that the
10. Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision Restores
Confrontation Clause Protection, 19 CRIM. JUST. 4, *5-6 (2004) [hereinafter Adjusting to
Crawford] (stating that overbreadth and vagueness of Roberts doctrine made
Confrontation Clause amorphous and manipulable because no clear standards set);
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004) (describing that for the unpredictable
Roberts standard, determination of reliability depended on which factors the judge
considers and the weight given to each).
11. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford, supra note 10, at *5.
12. See id.
13. Id. at *5-6. Friedman notes that hearsay exceptions do not necessarily sort
reliable from unreliable evidence. For example, statements, such as dying declarations,
might not be any more reliable just because one is about to meet his/her death, but falls
within a long-held hearsay exception and has been stringently protected by the Court.
14. Id. at *6.
15. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63.
16. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
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principle focus of the Confrontation Clause is testimonial
statements. 7  Michael Crawford was convicted of assault and
attempted murder.18 At issue in the appeal of his conviction was a
tape recording of a custodial interrogation of Crawford's wife,
Sylvia.19 The prosecution played the tape to refute Crawford's claim
of self-defense, and the tape was admissible under the hearsay
exception for declarations against penal interest; Sylvia was still a
suspect at the time of questioning. The statement bore guarantees of
trustworthiness because Sylvia's statement was "interlocked" with
Michael's statement, thus making it reliable.' The tape-recorded
interview was admitted even though Sylvia was unavailable to testify
at trial after invoking the marital privilege, and defendant Crawford
had no opportunity to cross-examine his wife about her out-of-court
statement." Crawford appealed his conviction and the admission of
Sylvia's statement, arguing that it violated his rights under the
Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court agreed, reversing
Crawford's conviction and altering previous confrontation analysis.22
The Court in Crawford articulated a new test to determine the
admissibility of evidence offered against the accused, closely
following the explicit text of the Confrontation Clause. If (1) the
declarant is legally unavailable to testify at trial and (2) the prior
statement is testimonial in nature, then testimony is not admissible
unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
witness.23  The witness is not required to be subject to cross-
examination at the time the statement was made or directly at trial.24
The witness, simply, must have been subject to cross-examination at
some earlier time.25 However, in 2004, a District Court of Appeal in
Florida held that a discovery deposition is not considered a prior
opportunity for cross-examination under the Crawford analysis.26 The
Lopez court stated that a discovery deposition is not used to
17. 541 U.S. at 68; Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford, supra note 10, at *7.
18. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 38-42.
21. Id. at 40.
22. See generally Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
23. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59.
24. Blanton v. State, 880 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
25. Id.
26. Lopez v. State, 888 So.2d 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2004).
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perpetuate testimony and the defendant is not entitled to be present.27
Therefore, as shown by the court in Lopez, it is unclear whether prior
testimony in the form of a deposition fulfills the requisites of
Crawford depending on the jurisdiction's jurisprudence.
To clarify, the ruling in Crawford only affects those statements
that are admitted for the truth of the matter asserted.28  If the
statement is not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, but
instead is being used for purposes such as impeachment or bias, the
statement is not subject to the rigid Confrontation Clause
requirements as fear of the statement being used improperly is
diminished. In Crawford, the Supreme Court did not explicitly state
the test to be applied to the admission of non-testimonial statements.
Thus, most jurisdictions have been applying the Roberts test of
reliability to non-testimonial statements.
Although the Crawford holding appears to be a bright line rule
consistent with the requisites of the Confrontation Clause 3°, the Court
left little guidance as to the definition of a "testimonial statement."31
The Court declined to provide an explicit definition of "testimonial,"
chosing instead to highlight three "core class[es] of 'testimonial'
statements" including:
'ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-
that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations,
prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-
examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants
would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially';
'extrajudicial statements... contained in formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions"; "statements that were made
under circumstances which would lead an objective
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be
available for use at a later trial.'
32
27. Id. at 700-01.
28. Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the
Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 516 (2005).
29. State v. Staten, 610 S.E.2d 823, 836 (S.C. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2005).
30. Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO.
L.J. 1011, 1030 (1998) (Confrontation Clause should be viewed as creating a bright-line
rule, not a presumptive rule subject to a balancing test which might allow evidence
admitted over a defendant's right of confrontation).
31. Mosteller, supra note 28, at 526.
32. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
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The Court did note that whatever the term "testimonial
statement" refers to, it applies, at a minimum, to "prior testimony at a
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to
police interrogations.
33
Several definitions for testimonial statements have been
proposed, but none has been definitively accepted. This lack of a
clear definition has lead to varying rulings by lower courts. However,
one definition has gained increasing interpretation and attention." In
an Amici Curiae Brief and thereinafter quoted in the majority's
opinion in Crawford, whether a statement was testimonial would
depend on the viewpoint and intention of the declarant; covered
statements would include those "made under circumstances which
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that statement
would be available for use at a later trial."35  The Court has not
explicitly adopted this definition, with some lower courts rejecting
this definition or combining it with other elements.36 However, it is
clear that before a testimonial statement can be admitted under the
Crawford test, two conditions must be fulfilled: (1) the declarant is
unavailable to testify at trial and (2) there was a prior opportunity for
cross-examination.
Unavailable to testify at trial
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) defines the situations wherein a
witness is considered unavailable, which include when the witness (1)
is precluded from testifying due to privilege; (2) refuses to testify
despite an order of the court to do so; (3) testifies as to lack of
memory of the subject matter of declarant's statement; (4) is unable
to testify due to death or physical or mental illness; or (5) is absent
from the hearing and attendance has not be able to be procured.37
Prior to Crawford, the Supreme Court articulated a clear
33. Id. at 68.
34. See Mosteller, supra note 28, at 530 (two other possible definitions for testimonial
include: (1) "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent;" (2) "extrajudicial
statements.., contained in formalized materials" (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52)).
35. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (quoting Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers et al.).
36. See State v. Staten, 610 S.E.2d 823, 829-30 (S.C. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2005)
(articulating a two-prong test for courts to use when applying the Crawford test: "(1) Was
the statement made to a governmental agent (or in response to questioning from a
governmental agent)? (2) Would the declarant expect his/her statement later to be used at
trial?"), see also, infra Section V(e) for discussion on this possible definition for
testimonial statements.
37. FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
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limitation on the unavailability requirement by stating that the
Roberts standard only required an unavailability analysis when the
challenged out of court statements were made in the course of a prior
judicial proceeding." The Court minimized the unavailability
determination, reasoning that the burdens on the prosecution to
prove unavailability outweigh any minor benefit of doing so. 9 The
Court believed that either proving that the hearsay statement had
sufficient guarantees of truthworthiness or that the statement fell
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception satisfied the Confrontation
Clause, and no further inquiry into the status of the declarant would
provide a greater benefit.4°  However, the Court in Crawford
reinvigorated the unavailability requirement. Under current case law,
when the Confrontation Clause is triggered by a testimonial
statement, that statement is inadmissible unless there was a prior
opportunity for cross-examination and the witness is unavailable. 1
The unavailability analysis is now an essential step in determining if
an out of court statement is admissible under the requisites of
Crawford.
Prior opportunity for cross-examination
The Court in Crawford repeatedly mentions that the defendant
must have had "a prior opportunity to cross-examine" the witness
who made the statement in order for the statement to be admitted. 42
This opportunity for cross-examination is defined as one that is "fairly
contemporaneous with a 'direct examination"', and need not take
place in the presence of the trier of fact.43 The proximity of the cross-
examination to the direct examination should have no effect on how
the fact finder evaluates the statements once admitted. '  This
requirement of an opportunity for cross-examination furthers the
goals of the Confrontation Clause-to prevent the admission of
38. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 354 (1992).
39. Id. at 354-55.
40. See id. (stating that once a statement qualifies for admission under a firmly rooted
hearsay exception, little can be added to booster its reliability and establishing that the
unavailability rule would only impose pointless litigation costs with few benefits to the
truth-seeking function).
41. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54.
42. Id. at 68. (emphasis added).
43. Blanton v. State, 880 So.2d 798, 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), but see Lopez v.
State, 888 So.2d 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2004) (holding that a discovery
deposition did not qualify as prior opportunity for cross examination).
44. Blanton, 880 So.2d at 801.
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statements that have not been tested through the adversarial
process.45 The court, in Blanton v. State, noted that only the
opportunity for cross must be protected, and the court should not
evaluate the zealousness with which a defendant seized that
opportunity.'
Similarly, the Confrontation Clause does not "bar admission of a
statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or
explain it."'4 7 If the declarant is available and testifies in court, the
Confrontation Clause is not implicated because the Clause is only
concerned with the unavailable declarant. 8 The Confrontation Clause
only assures an opportunity for cross-examination and does not rate
its overall effectiveness. 49 The opportunity for cross-examination, as
interpreted to be a requisite of the Confrontation Clause, allows triers
of fact to evaluate witness credibility, demeanor, and provide
defendants with an opportunity to test witness' statements 0
Ill. Impact on Child Abuse Reporting
The restrictive ruling in Crawford regarding the breadth of the
Confrontation Clause appears to devastate the usability of child
abuse reports and child witness statements due, in part, to the
uniqueness of the child declarant. Child abuse allegations will be
most effected because often the only witnesses in these cases are the
alleged victims and professionals who treat them, making the victim's
statements critical to any prosecution of the suspect. 1 Secondly, the
cases often involve witnesses who initially pursue prosecution but
later withdraw any active involvement, out of fear of retribution from
the suspect or disinterest in pressing charges.52 Lastly, child abuse
reports frequently have an issue with witness unavailability.53
Unavailability occurs when, because of age or intellect, the child is
45. Id.
46. Id. at 802.
47. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59, n.9.
48. See generally, id.
49. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988).
50. Amar, Sixth Amendment, supra note 4, at 688-89.
51. Sherrie Bourg Carter & Bruce M. Lyons, The Potential Impact of Crawford v.
Washington on Child Abuse, Elderly Abuse and Domestic Violence Litigation, 28
CHAMPION 21, *21-22 (2004).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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incompetent to testify.'A The child can be "emotionally unavailable"
to testify because the defendant is in the courtroom, or, alternatively,
the child can be lacking in knowledge or intellect." Correlated to this
point, the state has a responsibility to protect children from
unnecessary trauma caused by appearing on the witness stand. 6
In the wake of the Court's decision in Crawford, the near
majority of statements from children about abuse have been classified
as testimonial and excluded except where there was an opportunity
for cross-examination. Because of the classification as testimonial
statements, the reporting child will be required to take the witness
stand at trial, and potentially come face-to-face with the defendant. 7
IV. Examples of Testimonial Statements
Reviewing courts have been placing statements with certain
characteristics firmly within the realm of testimonial statements, and
thus, subjecting the statements to the more stringent Crawford test.
Factors leading to a classification of a testimonial statement include:
the presence of a government agent, structured questioning, a formal
interview process, and statements made with the direct purpose of
aiding and furthering an investigation or criminal prosecution. I will
address these various factors and recent case law decisions regarding
interviews and 911 calls in light of their impact on child abuse
reporting.
A. Involvement of a government actor
Crawford explicitly provides that a formal statement given to a
government officer is testimonial. 8 Most courts, however, have
expanded this characteristic of testimonial statements to any situation
in which the declarant knows that he or she is talking to a government
agent 9 Crawford refers to interrogation in the colloquial, not legal
sense, because a police officer's duties are to investigate and
54. Id.
55. Id. at *22 (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990)).
56. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. at 836 (1990) (state's interest in protecting minor
victims of sex crimes is a compelling one); see infra Section V(f).
57. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36 (2004) (when testimonial evidence is at issue,
admissibility depends on unavailability of witness and prior opportunity for cross
examination); see infra Section VI (alternatives for avoiding face-to-face confrontation,
such as closed circuit television, shielding, and videotaped interviews).
58. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
59. Mosteller, supra note 28, at 532-33.
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prosecute crimes."' Therefore, because the police officer's duty is to
prosecute crimes, an objective witness would reasonably believe that
the statement given to the police officer would be available for later
use at trial.61
In People v. Vigil, a police officer interviewed a child sexual
assault victim about the alleged assaults, and portions of the
videotaped interview were shown to the jury because the child,
having been found incompetent, did not testify.62 The court, in
holding the child's statements to be testimonial and inadmissible
without a prior opportunity for cross-examination, overlooked many
factors which would likely point to the admission of the statement,
including a relaxed atmosphere for investigation, open-ended, non-
leading questions, and no recitation of an oath.6 Instead, the court
focused on the strong importance of police officer presence,
especially an officer who had been duly trained in interrogation
techniques, and the determination that the child knew the difference
between truthfulness and lying.6 Because the defendant had no
opportunity to cross-examine the child about the statements made to
an interviewing officer-statements given in a situation which would
lead an objective person in child's position to believe that the
statements would be used at a later time to punish the defendant-
the introduction of the child's statements at trial violated defendant's
right to confront those witnesses against him.65
The court in In re T. T. differentiated a statement made by a child
victim of assault to a Department of Children and Family Services'
("DCFS") agent with a statement made to a doctor.66 The court held
that the statement made to the DCFS agent was made in response to
structured questioning with the intention of pursuing legal avenues,
and thus, was testimonial.67 However, statements made to a treating
60. In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789, 800 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. 53
n.4).
61. See In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d at 799.
62. People v. Vigil, No. 104 P.3d 258, 261 (Colo. Ct. App. June 17, 2004).
63. Id. at 262-63.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 263.
66. In re TT., 815 N.E.2d at 801-03 (I11. Ct. App. 2004).
67. Id. at 802, but see State v. Lackey, 120 P.3d 332, 345 (Kan. 2005) (analyzing that
although the admission of testimonial statements violated defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights, the court held the admission to be harmless error). See infra Section IV(a)(1) and
V(d) for discussion on role of administrative agencies, such as Department of Child and
Family Services, with regards to eliciting statements from children and as an extension of
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physician describing the symptoms, pain, or general nature of the
assault are not testimonial, as held in this case, if they do not accuse
or identify the perpetrator of the assault. 68
United States v. Bordeaux, however, explicitly stated that even if
statements have multiple purposes, they can still classified as
testimonial.69 In Bordeaux, a female child was referred to a center for
child evaluation after allegations of sexual assault by the defendant
arose. The child victim was first questioned and videotaped by a
forensic interviewer before being examined by a doctor, and a copy of
the videotape was retained both as part of the patient's medical
records and for law enforcement purposes.70 The Eighth Circuit held
that the statements were testimonial because they were elicited
during a police investigation and the purpose of the interview was to
collect information for law enforcement.7 Further, a copy of the
videotape was to be given to law enforcement, and the questioning
used was formal and structured.72 The court acknowledged that the
victim's statements also had a medical purpose, but noted that
Crawford did not indicate that "multipurpose statements cannot be
testimonial."" This ruling implies that as long as one of the
statement's purposes is to further a criminal investigation or will be
used prosecutorially in the future, then the statement will be
considered testimonial, even if the statement also has other,
traditionally non-testimonial uses.
Not all statements made to police officers are testimonial in
nature. People v. Cage contrasts a testimonial statement and a non-
testimonial statement, both of which were given to a police officer.7"
In Cage, defendant was convicted of assaulting his 15-year-old son
with a deadly weapon. In this case, defendant made three hearsay
statements, two of which are relevant here-including (1) to a police
the law enforcement community.
68. In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d at 803-04. See infra Section V(d) addressing the medical
diagnosis and treatment exception to hearsay evidence.
69. United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 556 (8th Cir. 2005). Bordeaux also
addresses the constitutionality of testimony made via closed circuit television, under the
requirements of Maryland v. Craig. See infra Section VI regarding Alternatives to In
Court Testimony. See also United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding
statements of victim's brother to pediatrician to be non testimonial); see also Section V(d)
regarding Statements Made to Medical Personnel and Social Workers.
70. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d at 555.
71. Id. at 556.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 846 (Cal. App. Ct. 2004).
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officer at the hospital while defendant was waiting to be treated and
(2) to a deputy while being interviewed and tape recorded at the
police station after receiving treatment at the hospital.75 The court
held the first statement at the hospital was not testimonial in nature
because there was no formalized interview process, no suspect was
under arrest, no trial was contemplated, there was no structured
questioning, and the deputy was still trying to determine if a crime
had even been committed.76 This statement, at the hospital, was the
result of open-ended questions, and defendant would not believe that
they would be used later. Although anyone who obtains information
that is relevant to a criminal investigation might pass it along to
police, testimonial statements are only those where declarants would
reasonably expect the statements to be used prosecutorially in the
future.'
The court in Cage did find that defendant's statement to the
deputy at the police station was testimonial because it included
structured police questioning and tape recording. 8 The court in Cage
noted the emphasis of government involvement and projected future
use of the testimony, because the accuser who "'makes a formal
statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a
person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.'
79
Cage provides a rare holding that statements given to law
enforcement officers might still be non-testimonial in nature, given
circumstances where no formal investigation is underway, no suspect
is articulated, and questioning is open-ended and unstructured.
Statements made to a family member might be deemed
testimonial if that family member acts as a surrogate for law
enforcement agencies. In an unusual holding, the court in State v.
Harr held that statements by the victim to her mother and
grandmother about gross sexual imposition were testimonial and
therefore, their admission violated the Confrontation Clause.8° The
court noted, however, the extraordinary circumstances in this case as
the mother confronted the child victim after being prompted by
police authorities."1 The child's statements in question about the
75. Id. at 849-50.
76. Id. at 856-57.
77. Id. For discussion of the "reasonable person" standard, see infra Section V(e).
7M Id. at 854.
79. Id. at 854-55 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (2004)).
80. 821 N.E.2d 1058, 1067-68 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 8,2004).
81. Id. at 1067.
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alleged sexual encounter occurred nearly two weeks after the event,
thereby eliminating the ability to be considered an excited utterance,
and were in response to leading questions by the mother.82 This case,
however, appears to be an exception; courts have almost universally
considered any involvement by government actors to constitute a
testimonial setting, while conversations with family members have
been given greater deference and latitude.
B. Extension of the law enforcement community
In addition, most courts have held that child protective
employees and social workers are included as part of the extended
law enforcement family. In People v. Warner, a 5-year-old child
mentioned that the defendant, her father, had touched her
inappropriately. 3 The minor was questioned by a multi-disciplinary
interview center (MDIC) specialist after her mother called Child
Protective Services.84 The court found this statement, made by the
child to a MDIC specialist, to be testimonial in nature because the
interview was similar to a police interrogation and was reasonably
expected to be used at trial.85 The court also noted that although the
MDIC interview is not intended to be used solely as an investigative
tool for criminal prosecutions, this is one of its many purposes, and
law enforcement officers were involved in the training of the MDIC
specialist.86
A Maryland court has extended the reach of law enforcement
agency to social workers. The court in Snowden v. State excluded
testimony of a licensed social worker who was testifying in lieu of first
person testimony from three alleged victims of child abuse, all of
whom were under the age of 10.87 The statements testified to at trial
by the social worker-statements made by the children to the social
worker during a series of interviews-were deemed testimonial in
nature because the children were interviewed with the express
81purpose of developing their testimony. Upon review by the Court of
Appeals of Maryland, the court noted that: child declarants were
aware of the prosecutorial purpose of their statements; the statements
82. Id.
83. People v. Warner, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 419, 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 429.
86. Id.
87. 846 A.2d 36 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004), affid 867 A.2d 314 (Md. 2004).
88. 846 A.2d 36, 47.
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were elicited by the social worker after initial questioning by police;
the children were brought to the interviews for the express purpose of
developing testimony for use at trial; the social worker only became
involved at the request of the police; and the interviews took place at
a location used for the purpose of investigating and assessing victims
of child abuse.'
In a similar vein, State v. Courtney held that a videotaped
interview by a child protection worker was testimonial in nature, and
thus, implicated the protections of the Confrontation Clause.9 The
child protection worker interviewed the child with the express
purpose of developing a case against the defendant so the statement
was made in anticipation of prosecutorial proceedings.91 In the wake
of Crawford v. Washington, courts have held that statements made to
government officials, including those made to social workers and
multi-disciplinary interview center specialists, are predominantly
testimonial because they are made with the reasonable intention of
being used prosecutorially in the future.
C. 911 calls
The admissibility of 911 calls is evaluated under a slightly
different analysis than that used for child abuse and interview
statements, but the reasoning behind these cases can provide
guidance for evaluating child abuse statements. Courts appear to be
adopting a case-by-case analysis to 911 calls, considering the intention
of the caller.' The Supreme Court of Minnesota concluded that
statements made during a 911 call moments after an attack were non-
testimonial in nature because of the "'trembling, stuttering, crying
[and] hyperventilating"' demeanor of the victims, the close temporal
proximity of the call to the incident, and the dialogue between the
victims and the operator seeking only to obtain information for
immediate intervention, and not future prosecution.93
In People v. Cortes, the People sought to introduce recordings of
two telephone calls made to 911 by two witness reporting
89. 867 A.2d 314, 325-328 (Md. 2004)
90. 682 N.W.2d 185, 196 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), rev'd State v. Courtney, 696 N.W.2d
73 (Minn. 2005) (holding that admission of videotaped interview was harmless error and
therefore, no Confrontation Clause analysis was necessary).
91. 682 N.W.2d 185, 196 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
92. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 613 S.E.2d 760 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (citing the
Washington Court of Appeals in State v. Powers which adopted a case-by-case approach to
911 calls) and State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 811 (Minn. 2005).
93. Id.
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observations of recent shootings. 9 The court struggled with the
definition of a "testimonial" statement. The court believed that a
standard of testimonial in which the declarant believes that statement
will be presented later at trial would require inquiry into the
declarant's mindset, possibly leading to inconsistent results.9
Ultimately, the court in Cortes held that calls to 911 were testimonial
under the Crawford test, without having to use a subjective test.96 The
purpose of the information elicited and gathered from a 911 call is for
potential use at trial when the call is made to report a crime and
provide information to police for later investigatory purposes.'
This testimonial view of 911 calls is not consistent across all
courts, even within the same state. In People v. Moscat, another New
York case, defendant sought to exclude as evidence the recording of a
911 call made by complainant in a domestic violence case.98 The court
noted that a 911 call is not initiated by police; but rather, the call
originates from the victim of the crime.99 The 911 call "has its genesis
in the urgent desire of the citizen to be rescued from immediate
peril."'1  While a testimonial statement is extracted by the
government in contemplation of future legal proceedings, the 911 call
is instigated by the victim who wants immediate protection.0'
At first glace, the holdings of Moscat and Cortes appear
diametrically opposed. However, upon closer inquiry of these cases,
the role and intention of the caller is dispositive in the determination
of whether or not the statement is testimonial. Cortes involved
bystanders, completing a 911 call to report observations to police with
the intention of aiding an investigation. On the other hand, the 911
caller in Moscat was the actual alleged victim of domestic violence.
The call in Moscat was more closely associated with an excited
utterance, an instinctual reaction to wanting protection from a posed
danger. Therefore, although somewhat of a tangential point to the
discussions of child abuse statements and their classification within or
94. People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401, 402 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
95. Id. at 414.
96. Id. at 415.
97. Id.
98. 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004).
99. Id. at 879.
100. Id.
101. Id.; see also People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)
(holding nontestimonial victim statements made to 911 operator after husband hit her
because the call was initiated by the victim to request assistance and bore no "indicia
common to the official and formal quality" of structured police questioning).
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outside the testimonial category, courts have focused on the intention
of the initiator for 911 calls. If the caller is the victim of an alleged
crime who initiates the communication to seek protection, the
statement is more similar to an excited utterance than a formal
pretrial examination by a Justice of the Peace in Reformation
England.1" Therefore, the call made by a victim, such as in Moscat, is
more likely to be classified as non-testimonial in nature and not
implicate the Confrontation Clause.
In United States v. Brito, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit encouraged a case-by-case examination into the totality of
circumstances to determine if an excited utterance should be deemed
testimonial in nature."3 The court noted that just because a statement
falls within the literal definition of an excited utterance, it does not
necessarily follow that the declarant lacked the ability to recognize
that the statement could be used for prosecutorial purposes.' Thus,
the Brito court proposes a two-step analysis to determine if an excited
utterance is testimonial. First, the court must determine whether a
particular hearsay statement qualifies as an excited utterance,
focusing on whether the defendant was under the stress of a startling
event."5 If so, the court must determine if a reasonable victim,
similarly situated, would have retained or regained capacity at the
time of the utterance to understand the legal ramifications of the
statement. °6
V. Non-testimonial Child Abuse Victim Statements
Court opinions since the Spring 2004 Supreme Court Term and
the Crawford decision have revealed several possible loopholes to
admit child abuse victim statements into court. At first glance,
102. See People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (a hurried and panicked conversation
between injured victim and telephone operator is not equivalent to a formal pretrial
examination by a Justice of the Peace in Reformation England); see also Crawford, 541
U.S. at 43-50 (discussing the history of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence).
103. 427 F.3d 53, 61 (1st Cir. 2005), see also State v. Parks, 116 P.3d 631 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2005) (holding that need to use a case-by-case inquiry to see if an excited utterance is
testimonial or not).
104. Brito, 427 F.3d at 61.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 61-62. The Brito court provided examples for the proper application of this
two set analysis. Statements made to police while the declarant is still in personal danger
are not considered to have been made with consideration of the legal ramifications, and
not testimonial, because the declarant is speaking out of urgency and desiring a prompt
response. However, once the immediate danger has passed, the declarant is more likely to
understand the larger significance of his or her words. Id. at 62 n.4.
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Crawford appears to prevent the admission of most of these
statements because, usually, children are often unavailable to testify
in court and they have not been subject to cross-examination.
However, courts have looked elsewhere to allow admission of these
statements, including exceptions such as: (1) unavailability of
witnesses; (2) statements made to family members and friends; (3)
relaxed conditions for excited utterances for children; (4) statements
made to medical personnel; (5) an alteration of the objective person
standard; (6) initiation by the victim, with no government coercion;
(7) the high state and judicial interest in allowing these statements to
be admitted; and (8) the rule of forfeiture. Some of these options are
more effective and provide a potential avenue to admissibility, while
others appear to lack credence with the courts. These areas will be
covered in turn below.
A. Unavailability of witnesses
Crawford and Confrontation Clause protections are only
implicated if the witness is determined to be unavailable."°
Therefore, should the child victim testify in court, they would be
subject to cross-examination and their prior statements would be
admissibleja Even if the child is unable to remember making the
statement, there is no Confrontation Clause violation because this
does not render a witness unavailable."° The Confrontation Clause
only requires an opportunity for cross-examination and does not
guarantee an effective cross-examination."'
However, child sexual abuse victims have unique problems
because they are often unable to testify because of fear, guilt, or
intimidation."' Child victims are determined to be unavailable if
unable to testify, unable to communicate in the courtroom, or
incompetent because they are unable to express themselves in a
manner to be understood. The child can start testifying; however,
should the defense be unable to cross-examine and complete the
testimony for any of the above-mentioned reasons (such as the child
freezing under continued questioning), then the child will be declared
107. Id. at 1374 (two-prong test of witness being unavailable and needing a prior
opportunity for cross examination).
108. See Fed. R. Ev. 613 (b).
109. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988).
110. Id.
111. In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789, 797 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
112. Id.
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unavailable, triggering the protections of the Confrontation Clause.'13
Therefore, there is little room to circumvent the unavailability
requirement by placing the child on the stand simply to deflect
questions. The Confrontation Clause is triggered as soon as the child
is unable to answer questions competently; thus, in effect, requiring
child victims to take the stand to explain completely their prior
statements.
B. Statements made to friends and family members
Child abuse victim statements made to friends or family
members should usually be admissible because they are not similar to
structured police questioning and are not made with the expectation
that they will be used prosecutorially later. Crawford outlined
examples of testimonial statements - basically statements which are
made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact, and used
to develop evidence and aid in a criminal investigation."4 The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals defined this point, holding in United States
v. Manfre that Crawford is inapplicable because statements "made to
loved ones or acquaintances.., are not the kind of memorialized,
judicial-process-created evidence to which Crawford speaks."
115
Recent court decisions have held that statements to family
members and friends are not testimonial because no government
agent is involved and there is no intention for use in a future
prosecution. Although not a case about child abuse reporting, in
Demons v. State, a co-worker of a murder victim testified about the
victim's fear of the accused, threats to kill him, and physical bruises
which appeared days before the alleged murder. 6  The court
distinguished these non-testimonial statements and permitted them to
be admitted into evidence because they were not "remotely similar to
such prior testimony or police interrogation, as they were made...
[to] a friend, and without any reasonable expectation that they would
be used at a later trial."".7
Child victims' statements to family members can be critical to a
113. Id. (citing People v. Coleman, 563 N.E.2d 1010 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (at the point
when the child witness is unable to proceed with testimony, he or she is properly
considered unavailable)).
114. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-53, 68 (giving examples of "testimonial" statements and
defining the word "testimony", while the Court refused to give a precise definition of the
"testimonial").
115. 368 F.3d 832, 838 n.1 (8th Cir. 2004).
116. 595 S.E.2d 76, 79-80 (Ga. 2004).
117. Id. at 80.
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prosecution. Often victims are too young or too frightened to be
subjected to intense direct and cross-examination in the courtroom.
Although unable to provide formal testimony, the child often can give
an account of the events in a more relaxed, familiar, and spontaneous
atmosphere at home."8
However, statements made to private individuals can and should
be attributed to government involvement if law enforcement has
substantial involvement in procuring and requesting the
information.'1 9 This reasoning was used in State v. Harr, whereby the
court held statements made by the 7-year-old child abuse victim to
her mother and grandmother to be testimonial.2  The court
emphasized that the investigating officer had contacted the family to
uncover information about the incidents, and the victim's statement
was given nearly two weeks after the events.'21
In general, statements made to family members will be
considered non-testimonial and will not trigger the protections of the
Confrontation Clause. However, family members need to be
"unassociated with government activity." 2 In addition, it may be
critical to determine if the statement was accusatory in particularly
naming the perpetrator and if the statement was intended to be
conveyed to law enforcement investigators."z If this was the case,
then the statement might be more similar to those directly protected
by the Confrontation Clause.
C. Excited utterances and spontaneous declarations
Under the hearsay exception in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2),
victim's statements reporting child abuse may be admissible
notwithstanding the Crawford holding if the declarant has no time for
118. Herrera-Vega v. State, 888 So.2d 66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (deciding that a
spontaneous statement by victim to mother and father are not testimonial); Somervell v.
State, 883 So.2d 836 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that statements made by child to
mother does not fit within the "penumbra" of any of the categories of testimonial
statements listed in Crawford); see United State v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439 (8th Cir. 1986).
Dorian was decided before the Crawford holding and admitted a 5-year-old victim's
statements about her sexual abuse. The court held that the statements were
constitutionally admissible under the Confrontation Clause in the interests of justice.
119. Mosteller, supra n ote 28, at 574.
120. 821 N.E.2d 1058, 1067-68 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
121. Id.
122. People v. Compan, 100 P.3d 533, 537 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), affd, 121 P.3d 876
(Colo. 2005).
123. Mosteller, supra note 28, at 554-56.
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reflective thought. In this case, it is less likely that the statement
will be fabricated because of the short time frame between the events
and the making of the statement. In other words, the statement is
considered an instinctual response. The court in People v. Rivera
drew a traditional line, admitting the telephoned statement of a
victim's girlfriend which identified the defendant, an accused
murderer. 125 The court looked at various factors including: the fact
that the declaration was made within minutes of the stabbing; the
declarant was crying; declarant was clearly under continuing stress of
the shocking event; and the declarant did not have time for "studied
reflection.
12 6
Along similar lines, State v. Orndorff acknowledged that excited
utterances made immediately in response to a stressful event are not
testimonial in nature because they are not made in response to police
questioning.27 In this case, the victim of burglary and assault stated
that she saw a man with a pistol leaving, tried to call 911, and was
panic stricken.2 2 The court held that these spontaneous declarations
were non-testimonial because they were not a declaration or
affirmation used to establish or prove a fact; they were not in
response to police questioning; and the declarant had no reason to
expect that the statements would be used in a future trial.2 9
The court in State v. Forrest explicitly stated that Crawford does
not prohibit spontaneous statements made by unavailable witnesses
from being admitted.3  In Forrest, the alleged assault victim,
immediately after being freed from the grasps of her kidnapper,
blurted out to police officers what defendant had done to her inside
the house.' Following the reasoning of Moscat,'32 the Forrest court
held that these were non-testimonial statements because the victim
124. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
125. 778 N.Y.S.2d 28, 29 (N.Y. App. Ct. 2004).
126. Id.
127. 95 P.3d 406, 408 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 596 S.E.2d 22, 27-28 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004), affd, 611 S.E.2d 833 (N.C. 2005)
131. Id. at 23-24.
132. See People v. Moscat. 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004) (hurried and
panicked conversation between injured victim and 911 telephone operator is not
equivalent to a formal pretrial examination by a Justice of the Peace in Reformation
England); see also supra Section IV(b) regarding discussion of admissibility of 911 calls;
see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43-50 (2004) (discussing the history of
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence).
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had no time for reflection and the comments were initiated by the
victim. 133 The court, in this case, extended the scope and time allowed
for giving excited utterances. The court included under the umbrella
of non-testimonial statements those made while responding to
questions from the detective immediately after arrest, because the
demeanor of crying, shaking, and overall nervousness continued.
3'
As stated in Forrest, it has been suggested that the strict temporal
requirements for excited utterances made by child witnesses should
be liberalized.' The Harr court did not admit a child victim's
statements to his mother made two weeks after the alleged incident.'36
However, the mother in that case was prompted by police and used
leading questions, and again, the conversation occurred two weeks
after the alleged incident."'
Although few courts have endorsed liberalizing spontaneous
declaration policies for children, perhaps a moderate liberalizing and
relaxing of the timing requirements for excited utterances should be
used in cases of child abuse reporting. Child abuse can be a
traumatizing event in and of itself, and the startling nature of the
event may last longer than that caused by other stimuli and crimes.
Yet even if the courts adopted such a viewpoint, the excited utterance
exception probably would rarely be used for child abuse victims
because the statements implicating the defendant would still have to
be made in reasonable proximity to the actual event. Because abuse
victims are often encouraged, or threatened, by their attackers to not
report the event, accusatory statements are often slow to trickle out
to authorities. Although a moderate enlargement of the timing for
abuse victims might be possible, it would rarely be utilized and not
the best avenue for admitting these crucial statements. Under current
case law, the courts analyze the intent of the declarant and the
recipient when dealing with excited utterances; if the declarant
intends the excited utterance to be simply a cry for help and not
reasonably intended to be used in a later prosecutorial manner, then
the utterances are deemed non-testimonial and subject to traditional
hearsay analysis. However, if the declarant could reasonably expect
that the statement be used at a later trial, then the statement will be
133. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d at 27.
134. Id.
135. State v. Harr, 821 N.E.2d 1058, 1067-68 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
136. Id.
137. Id.
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deemed testimonial and subject to Crawford analysis.'
D. Statements to medical personnel and social workers
Child abuse statements made to medical personnel are generally
admissible. However, statements made to social workers are
probably inadmissible as they are usually considered extensions of the
law enforcement community.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4), even when the declarant
is available as a witness, statements, used for medical diagnosis or
treatment which depict medical history, or "past or present
symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character
of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent
to diagnosis or treatment" are admissible.139 Courts specifically focus
on only permitting information which is necessary for treatment by a
medical professional. Statements made to medical personnel are
admissible under Crawford because such personnel are not
performing any "function remotely resembling that of a Tudor,
Stuart, or Hanoverian justice of the peace."'" Crawford repeatedly
stressed the critical importance of government involvement in
testimonial statements 1, involvement which is usually absent from
statements made to medical personnel.
In United States v. Penaux, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal
had to determine the use of statements made to medical
professionals.1 2  In Penaux, a pediatrician interviewed the child
brother of a sexual assault victim, also a child, about burns on his
body. 43 These statements made by the victim's brother were not
considered testimonial because: the pediatrician conducted the
interviewed, not police; no forensic interview preceded the meeting;
and the interview lacked substantial government involvement.
14
Additionally, the interviewee was not the victim in this case, and the
statement made by the victim's brother was used to give medical aid
in the form of diagnosis and/or treatment.4
In State v. Vaught, an emergency room physician examined a four
138. See State v. Staten, 610 S.E.2d 823, 829-30 (S.C. App. Ct. 2005).
139. FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
140. People v. Cage, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 846, 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
141. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-53 (2004).
142. 432 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2005).
143. Id. at 896.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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year-old sexual assault victim shortly after the alleged abuse.14 6 The
physician testified that, during the examination, the victim stated that
"'her Uncle DJ put his finger in her pee-pee." ' 147 The Supreme Court
of Nebraska held that this statement was not a "testimonial"
statement under Crawford because it did not have the attributes as
described by the Supreme Court and the statement was made by the
victim for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. '" This
court held a very expansive viewpoint of medical statements. Even
though the victim identified her alleged perpetrator in this statement,
there was no "indication of government involvement in the initiation
or course of examination," and thereby did not trigger special
Confrontation Clause protection.
49
This holding in Vaught appears to be an extension of Cage,
wherein a statement made by the 15-year-old victim of child abuse to
the doctor at the hospital was held to be non-testimonial.5 The court
in Cage also emphasized the role of government involvement in
testimonial statements, an element which is lacking in most, if not all,
medical treatment environments.' Crawford pertains to statements
that "declarants would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially"'52; reasonable persons would not expect that
statements to medical personnel, and given to receive medical
treatment, would be used at a later trial. For this reason, most
statements made in response to questions by physicians for the
purposes of medical diagnosis are considered non-testimonial because
such physicians are not government employees, the statements are
used for the purposes of medical treatment, and the statements are
not intended for future prosecution.53
146. 682 N.W.2d 284, 286 (Neb. 2004).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 291 (testimonial statements consist of ex parte testimony or functional
equivalent).
149. Id.
150. People v. Cage, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 846, 854-55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
151. Id.
152. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
153. See State v. Scacchetti, 690 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a
three-year-old victim's out of court statements to examining physician about defendant's
sexual abuse are not testimonial because statements made in response to questions for
purposes of medical diagnosis and not posed by a government agent) and State v. Fisher,
108 P.3d 1262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that statement to physician in response to
what happened was not testimonial because doctor was not government employee,
defendant was not under suspicion at the time, and was not foreseeable that statement
would be used by prosecution at a later time).
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The difficult issue arises when the identity of the perpetrator of
the assault is disclosed during a medical diagnosis and/or subsequent
treatment, as this information is not generally required for services.
However, one could argue that in a case of child abuse, medical
personnel are responsible for the overall health and safety of the
victim. Thus, it is critical to know the identity of the assailant,
thereby preventing any further harm and providing comprehensive
treatment. In this sense, even a statement to medical personnel which
identifies the perpetrator would be admissible under the hearsay
exception of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4), as the identity is
necessary for proper medical treatment and safety.
Statements to social workers and child protective service
investigators are not per se inadmissible.'" However, if the child
protective services office works under order of and together with the
state and prosecutor's office to assist in their prosecutorial function,
then the persons are considered agents of the prosecution. 55 Child
protection units usually are considered extensions of the prosecutorial
team because the interviews are motivated by the search for evidence,
and these repetitive procedural events are defined by their context
and not the expectations of the parties involved.'56 Although nearly
all statements to social workers and child protective services will be
considered testimonial in nature, an inquiry into the interaction
between the agent and the specific law enforcement office may
provide latitude for the statement's admissibility.
E. Objective person standard revisited
Although not formally approved by the Supreme Court, the
vague language of an objective person standard might provide a
permissible avenue to admit child abuse victims' statements into
court. The majority in Crawford mentioned, although did not full-
heartedly endorse, a proposed definition of testimonial statements
advanced as amici curiae by the National Association of Criminal
154. In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789, 801,803 (11. App. Ct. 2004); see supra Section IV(a)(1)
regarding the extension of law enforcement community.
155. In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d at 801; see State v. Courtney, 682 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2004) (holding that a statement to a child protection worker is testimonial because
they work along with law enforcement officer for the purpose of developing a case against
the defendant), rev'd, 696 N.W.2d 73 (Minn. 2005) (holding that the admission of
videotaped interview was harmless error and therefore, no Confrontation Clause analysis
is necessary).
156. John F. Yetter, Wrestling with Crawford v. Washington and the New Constitutional
Law of Confrontation, 78 FLA. B.J. 26, 29 (2004).
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Defense Lawyers.'57 This definition of testimonial statements includes
those "that were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be
available for use at a later trial." 158
Some scholarly analysis has disregarded any emphasis of this
declarant-centric approach to the Confrontation Clause and
testimonial statements. There are three potential problems with a
declarant-centric approach: (1) there is no historical evidence that the
Framers were concerned about declarant expectations, instead only
focused on the rights of the accused; (2) there are many testimonial
statements that would not be covered by this declarant-focused
formula, including children's statements which have no intention of
later evidentiary use; and (3) the Court in Crawford only mentioned
this definition in passing, and used an entirely different analysis to
decide the case.159 The Appellate Court of Illinois argued that the use
of declarant's age and state of mind in the determination of a
testimonial statement would "undermine the Confrontation Clause's
protections" because of its vague and manipulable standard.'
6°
Courts, in their interpretations, have held differing viewpoints as
to the definition of an objective witness; namely, if the definition
should be the intention of the specific declarant or of the generic
reasonable person. The court in People v. Sisavath noted, in a
footnote, that the Supreme Court conceivably could have been
referring to an objective witness in the same category of persons as
the actual witness, including that of a child witness.161 However, the
California Court of Appeal disregarded this proposition, believing
that the Court meant that the statement is testimonial if it was given
under circumstances in which its use in a future prosecution is
reasonably foreseeable by an objective observer.62
Other courts seem to interpret this objective reasonable person
test differently. Another California Court of Appeal, in People v.
Cage, first noted that declarant's subjective understanding is
157. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004).
158. Id. (quoting Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al., as
Amici Curiae 3).
159. Yetter, supra note 155, at 29.
160. In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d at 802 (holding that child's statements to DCFS agent were
testimonial, even though interview was conducted in the victim's home two months after
call to hotline).
161. 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 753,758, n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
162. Id. (emphasis added).
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irrelevant.163 The court went on to state, in the same opinion, that the
Supreme Court wanted an objective, reasonable person test, and
courts should analyze if a reasonable person in declarant's shoes
would have expected statements made to a doctor to be used at a
later trial."6 It appears, although disregarding a declarant's subjective
understanding, the court did analyze how an objective person in
declarant's shoes would believe the statement be used. 165 This analysis
opens the door to allow analysis into how the specific declarant child
would view the statement, instead of interpreting what an objective
observer, most likely an adult, would believe.
The Colorado Court of Appeals appears to use a similar
viewpoint. People v. Vigil held that a child victim's videotaped
statement to police officer was testimonial."6 However, the child had
been told that the interviewer was a police officer, the child knew the
difference between being truthful and lying, and the child knew that
the defendant assailant might go to jail.' 67 The court stated that the
testimonial determination is based on what "would indicate to an
objective person in the child's position that statements were intended
for use at a later proceeding that would lead to punishment of
defendant."'16
Scholars, those favoring the protection of child abuse statements,
have provided alternative interpretations to this objective person test.
Richard Friedman, recognizing that a child reacts and communicates
differently than adults, argues that a person is not a witness unless he
or she understands that the given statement may have adverse
consequences for the person accused.69 Because the Confrontation
Clause is driven by a desire to require the accuser to confront the
accused, Friedman realizes that it is a societal question as to how
much responsibility and obligation to place in the hands of children.17°
Thus, the cognitive and mental development of a child would be
taken into account to determine the testimonial nature of a statement
163. People v. Cage, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 846, 855 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that
statement made to doctor is not testimonial).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. 104 P.3d 258, 262 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
167. Id. at 262-63.
168. Id. at 263 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004)) (emphasis
added).
169. Adjusting to Crawford, supra note 10, at *10.
170. Id.
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given by a child witness.
This moderately expansive view of an objective person test for
testimonial statements has not been explicitly endorsed by the
Supreme Court. However, Justices Thomas and Scalia's concurrence
in White v. Illinois stated that a subjective formula to decide if
statements were made in contemplation of legal proceedings "would
entangle the courts in a multitude of difficulties" because of the
subjective nature of the inquiry."' Instead, the two Justices suggested
that the Confrontation Clause protections should be limited to any
witness who actually testifies at trial, and only extrajudicial
statements contained in formal testimonial materials, such as
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions should be
governed by the Confrontation Clause." These materials are limited
so as to support the history and original purpose of the Confrontation
Clause-to prevent depositions and ex parte affidavits, anonymous
accusers and absentee witnesses in lieu of personal examination in
court. 73
Child abuse victims' statements have a greater possibility of
admittance under an expansive view of an objective person test
because children often do not comprehend the potential later uses of
the statements. However, such a formula would require inquiry into
the cognitive development of the child at issue. A better approach
would be to limit Confrontation Clause protections. This was
heralded originally by Justice Thomas in his concurrence in White,
limiting the Confrontation Clause to only those statements at which
the Clause was originally intended-that of formalized affidavits,
depositions, and prior testimony. Under this narrow definition, child
abuse statements would not be eligible for Confrontation Clause
protections, and thereby only analyzed under traditional hearsay
rules.
F. High state interest in keeping children off the witness stand
Beyond deciphering the Framers' original intention when
drafting the Confrontation Clause, the state has an inherent interest
in protecting children from likely harmful situations. Prior to the
decision in Crawford, courts acknowledged the need to balance
171. 502 U.S. 346, 364 (1992) (J. Thomas and Scalia, concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment). It should be noted that Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in
Crawford, 14 years after the holding in White, to which Justice Thomas joined.
172. Id. at 365.
173. Id. at 362, 365.
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competing interests in the sensitive arena of child abuse reports.
In United States v. Dorian, the Eighth Circuit admitted a child's
statement of abuse under the two-prong test of Roberts, even though
the defendant had not cross-examined the declarant .' Additionally,
the court noted that the Supreme Court has construed the
Confrontation Clause in a "pragmatic fashion, recognizing the need
to balance the rights of the accused against the public's 'strong
interest in effective law enforcement.' '' 17 The strong public interest is
nowhere stronger than in the case of defenseless child abuse victims.176
The Court has acknowledged that the state has a compelling
interest in "'the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further
trauma and embarrassment.' ' 177  The Court held, in Maryland v.
Craig, that this state interest in protecting child abuse victims may be
sufficiently important to outweigh a defendant's right to face his or
her accusers in court.17 8 In Craig, the Court created a case specific test
based on an adequate showing of necessity, thereby allowing the child
victim to testify using alternative methods and not physically face the
defendant in court.79
The Court should continue to acknowledge the compelling
interest of the state to protect child abuse victims from further trauma
in court, even under the new Crawford framework. Nothing has
changed to make children less susceptible to emotional damage from
having to face the accused in court. Because there is a compelling
state interest, the Court should fashion rules, such as those covered
above regarding excited utterances, statements to medical personnel
or family members, and the definition of a reasonably objective
person, which further the state's strong interest in protecting child
victims from further harm.
G. Rule of forfeiture still active
Crawford explicitly stated that the rule of forfeiture is still
acceptable and active in Confrontation Clause analysis.1° The rule of
forfeiture states that if the accused's own misconduct prevents him or
174. 803 F.2d 1439, 1447 (8th Cir. 1986).
175. Id. (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980)).
176. Id. (citing United States v. Cree, 778 F.2d 474, 478 n.7 (8th Cir. 1985)).
177. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 852 (1990) (citations omitted).
178. Id. at 853.
179. Id. at 855-56. For the status of Craig, and the possibility for alternative forms of
testimony, under the new Crawford framework, see infra Section VI.
180. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
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her from having an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the
witness, then the accused should be considered to have waived the
right of confrontation.'81 This is a way in which courts can guarantee
that defendants do not benefit from their own bad acts.
Defendant's procurement can be shown in child abuse cases by
their use of threats and trauma imposed upon the child victims9
Studies have shown that abuse can continue in the courtroom, with
abusers reasserting control to convince victims not to cooperate or
participate in judicial proceedings.83
A child victim being traumatized by the presence of the accused
is a direct consequence of the accused's actions. Therefore, viewed in
this light, the rule of forfeiture could be applicable to the
unavailability of child abuse victims. Using this principle, the
defendant, through his or her own misconduct, has caused the victim
to be unavailable, unable to be subject to cross-examination, and
thus, should be deemed to have waived the right of confrontation.
Opponents might argue that this is too broad of an extension of the
rule of forfeiture, which is usually used where the defendant has
harmed the potential witness, traditionally in a physical or financial
way. However, this extension of the rule of forfeiture might be
properly combined with the compelling state interest in protecting
child victims from further harm, and thereby allow the admission of
statements without requiring in-court testimony.
H. Initiation by the victim and not the state
Justice Scalia, in writing the majority opinion for the Court in
Crawford, focused on the Framer's intentions in writing the
Confrontation Clause. Scalia noted that the Confrontation Clause
was principally directed at the use of ex parte examinations against
the accused.' " The text of the Clause itself focuses on those who bear
witness against the accused. In the same respect, Crawford
explicitly noted that "an accuser who makes a formal statement to
government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who
makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.', 86 The Court is
181. Adjusting to Crawford, supra note 10, at *8.
182. Adam M. Krischer, "Though Justice May be Blind, It is Not Stupid", 38
PROSECUTOR 14, 15 (2004).
183. Id.
184. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
185. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
186. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
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seemingly making a clear distinction with formal statements made to
government officers and more informal statements made to others.
Additionally, lower courts have considered who initiated the
making of such a statements, whether it be the police who
approached the witness or a voluntary action by the victim."8 In
People v. Moscat, a complainant in a domestic assault case called 911
after allegedly being assaulted by the defendant." The court held
that the 911 call was not testimonial in nature because it was initiated
by the victim of the crime, and its goal was to gain immediate rescue
from potential danger."' The purpose of this call was not to
investigate or prosecute a suspect; instead, it was to gain protection
from peril following a crime, made while the victim was still in a
startled and shocked state."9 Moscat reiterated the intention of the
Framers - to prohibit formal ex parte examinations by a Justice of the
Peace in Reformation England-and such a 911 call is distinguishable
from this intention. 191
Similarly, in State v. Barnes, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine found to be non-testimonial several statements made by victim
to police officers about an earlier assault by her son.'9 The court
reasoned that there was no structured police questioning, the mother
went to the police station on her own, she was still under stress of
assault by the defendant, and officers were not questioning her
pursuant to an active criminal investigation."
Therefore, following this line of reasoning, statements that are
initiated by victims of sexual assault, and not by the government,
could conceivably be considered non-testimonial in nature, especially
if the victim is still under the stress or shock of the event. An
interesting opposition to such a statement would place the
Confrontation Clause as a requirement upon the accuser of a crime.
187. The focus on who initiated the contact can also relate to the determination if an
objective reasonable person would expect the statement to be used later at trial. Should
the victim initiate contact with law enforcement, they might be less likely to be expected it
to be used later at trial. However, other considerations include the details of events
provided the officer, the state of mind of the declarant, as well as if the defendant was
identified in such an interaction. See supra Section V(e) regarding the objective person
standard.
188. 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2004).
189. Id. at 879.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 880.
192. 854 A.2d 208 (Me. 2004).
193. Id, generally.
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In such an accuser obligation approach, the witness has an obligation
to confront the defendant, as the accuser is "casting a stone" and
should be required to come forward and not hide in the shadows of
the accusation."
Even if we shift the obligations of the Confrontation Clause to
the accuser, children present a unique problem due to their still
developing mental and cognitive state. A child who cannot face the
accused in court, in some degree, lacks the courage, which adults are
assumed to possess, to confront those he or she accuses.! But, as
shown in countless examples where our society does not expect
children to have the maturity to make independent decisions until age
18, we should continue not to expect or require that children have the
same fortitude that is required of adults.196 Factors which should be
considered to determine the obligation imposed upon children
include the age of the child, the understanding of the implications of
their statements, as well as considerations into the availability of
alternative forms of testimony which would not cause continued harm
upon the child. 97
However, weighing of considerations such as age, cognitive
development, understanding of consequences, and the creation of an
objectively reasonable person in declarant's position might create a
subjective nightmare. Little consistency would exist to aid
prosecutors and law enforcement in conducting investigations. The
courts would be thrown into a plethora of case-by-case evaluations,
hypothesizing about the mental state of the child in question.
Instead, perhaps a more logical approach would be to hold fast to the
framework of Crawford, accepting that children need special
protections, and proposing alternatives to in-court testimony-
thereby protecting the defendant's right of confrontation while, at the
same time, preventing further trauma upon the child and protecting
their critical statements.
VI. Alternatives to In-Court Testimony
While the Sixth Amendment requires the right of confrontation,
the Supreme Court has held that the right to face-to-face
confrontation is not absolute. In 1988, with Coy v. Iowa, the Court
* 194. Sherman J. Clark, An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the Confrontation Clause,
81 NEB. L. REV. 1258, 1264-68 (2003).
195. Id. at 1281.
196. See id.
197. Id. at 1283.
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held that a screen between the defendant and the child sexual assault
victim violated defendant's confrontation rights.198  The Court
reasoned that it was essential to a fair criminal trial to have face-to-
face confrontation between the accused and the accuser.199 However,
in closing, the Court left open the possibility for exceptions to this
rule, but only "when necessary to further an important public policy"
and individualized findings demanding such allowances have been
made.2 00 In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor noted that nothing in
the Coy opinion prevented state legislatures from protecting child
witnesses, and that the Clause only shows a preference for face-to-face
confrontation. 20' O'Connor explicitly opined that these rights upheld
by the majority are not absolute, but can give way to other competing
interests in order to protect a child from trauma of courtroom
testimony, as long as there is a showing of necessity."
Maryland v. Craig reiterated that the Confrontation Clause only
expresses a preference for face-to-face confrontation, and there are
certain circumstances which permit the admission of hearsay
statements notwithstanding the declarant's inability to confront the
defendant at trial. 20 3 The exception permitted in Craig, whereby face-
to-face confrontation is not required, is only permitted if it is
necessary to further an important public policy and when the
reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured. 2" Accordingly, the
Court held that where it is necessary to protect a child witness from
trauma caused by the physical presence of the defendant, the
Confrontation Clause does not prohibit an alternative method of
testifying, as long as the reliability of evidence is tested through the
adversarial process.0 The State must make a showing of necessity; in
Craig, the State's interest in protecting a child witness from the
trauma of testifying in a child abuse case was "sufficiently important
to justify the use of a special procedure" to testify without face-to-
face confrontation of the defendant. 20' The Court upheld the
198. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
199. Id. at 1017.
200. Id. at 1021.
201. Id. at 1023-24 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 (1980)) (emphasis added)
(J. O'Connor, concurrence).
202. Id. at 1022, 1025.
203. 497 U.S. 836, 847-49 (1990).
204. Id. at 850.
205. Id. at 857.
206. ld. at 855.
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constitutionality of allowing a child to testify via a one-way closed
circuit television procedure after a case-specific finding of necessity
was made.2°7
Therefore, pursuant to Craig, to waive the face-to-face
confrontation requirement, the Court requires two particular
findings: (1) the presence of the accused would traumatize the child
witness and (2) emotional distress must be more than de minimus. 8
Alternatives to face-to-face confrontation include: placing a screen
between child witnesses and the defendant during child's testimony;
transmitting child's testimony via closed-circuit television; and
admitting children's otherwise inadmissible hearsay testimony.2'
With the holding in Crawford and the requirement of the opportunity
for cross-examination, it is unlikely that courts will allow the
admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay testimony. Instead, it is
more likely that courts will seek an alternative method for child
testimony, whereby a child is protected from the additional trauma
caused by the physical presence of the defendant, while the
defendant's right of cross-examination is still protected.
The use of shielding procedures or closed circuit television is
perhaps the most likely alternative, and fulfills three out of the four
goals of the Confrontation Clause as stated in Craig. The shielding
procedure ensures that the witness will give testimony under oath,
that the witness is subject to cross-examination, and that the jury is
able to observe the demeanor of the witness.2 10 Due to the compelling
interest of the state, this solution would waive the physical presence
requirement for children.
The rule of Craig should continue to be valid even in the face of
the requirements of Crawford, as they address different areas of
Confrontation Clause protections. "Crawford addresses the question
of when confrontation is required; Craig addresses the question of
what procedures confrontation requires.. 2 . Crawford substantively
requires the opportunity for cross-examination, while Craig provides
an alternative to the physical presence requirement while the accuser
is cross-examined. It is important to use the reasoning of Craig and
207. See generally id.
208. Id. at 855-56.
209. Dorothy F. Marsil, et al., Child Witness Policy: Law Interfacing with Social
Science, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 209 (2002).
210. Craig, 497 U.S. at 845-46, 851; Nancy Gertner, Videoconferencing: Learning
Through Screens, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS J. 769, 777 (2004).
211. Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted, supra note 5, at 454.
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the emphasis on the public policy and state's interest in protecting
children to formulate alternative methods of testimony for children in
the future.
However, recently, the constitutionality of the Craig decision has
been questioned by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. In United
States v. Bordeaux, a child sexual assault victim took the witness stand
in court and began her testimony."' She was, shortly thereafter,
unable to continue her testimony and the court permitted her,
because the victim was afraid of the defendant and the courtroom, to
testify from a separate room via two-way closed-circuit television.213
Defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and appealed
his conviction claiming that his Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation was violated."' The Bordeaux court found that "virtual
'confrontations' offered by closed circuit television systems fall short
of the face-to-face standard because they do not provide the same
truth-inducing effect;" the witness does not have to endure an
unmediated gaze from the defendant in the courtroom which may
deter any attempt at untruthfulness. 215 The court did not overturn
Craig, but rather, only clarified the requirements for alternative
methods of testimony. Bordeaux held that the court must find that
the witness victim's fear of the defendant is the dominant reason for
unavailability to testify in court, not simply a reason.216
With this recent Eighth Circuit decision in Bordeaux, the
constitutionality of Craig stands, with stringent requirements. Child
victims are provided with alternatives to in-court testimony but only if
the court makes a case specific finding that the predominant reason
for inability to testify is caused directly by defendant's presence in the
courtroom and that the emotional distress caused to the victim must
be more than de minimus.
VII. Conclusion
The aftermath of Crawford left the world of child protective
services and prosecutorial officers in a state of disarray. Murkiness
still exists as to the permissible avenues in which courts may admit
child abuse reporting statements. Crawford made a bright line rule to
212. 400 F.3d 548, 552 (8th Cir. 2005).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 554.
216. Id. at 555.
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require the opportunity for cross-examination should the declarant be
unavailable to testify at trial. However, under a narrow reading of
this rule, nearly all child victim statements would be excluded as they
rarely have been exposed to the adversarial process. These
statements are often the only eyewitness accounts, and are necessary
for a successful prosecution.
A balance needs to be struck between protecting the rights of the
defendant to cross-examine his accusers and the compelling interests
of the State to protect vulnerable child victims. Shielding procedures
and closed circuit television testimony provide an alternative to close
physical proximity with the defendant and might serve as a
compromise between the two rights.

